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A BOTCHED LAUNCH

THE MASSIVE Titan III rocket sat on the launch pad
while technicians, working furiously on the nose cone
assembly, prepared the Intelsat spacecraft for its long
journey to geosynchronous orbit.' Unfortunately, the
telecommunications satellite never reached its final destination. A Martin Marietta2 technician, responsible for
mating the satellite to its orbital booster, mistakenly wired
the deployment mechanism for a pair of satellites rather
than for the intended single satellite. At the critical time
of deployment of both the satellite and its Payload Assist
Module (PAM), the resulting computer commands failed
to eject the cargo from the second stage of the Titan III.
After several minutes, the confused ground control team
finally managed to separate the payload from the rocket.
The telecommunications satellite, originally designed to
perch 22,300 miles above the equator, fell uselessly into
low Earth orbit. Intelsat claimed that the failure of the
Martin Marietta ground crew to detect a key wiring error
caused the late separation.4 In a suit for declaratory judgment, a federal district court found Martin Marietta free
from liability for negligence or even gross negligence.5
The court based this decision on the public policy anFor a general account of the facts surrounding the loss of the Intelsat satellite,
see Mark A. Hofmann, Intelsat Sues Satellite Launch Firm; Seeks $400 Million for
Botched Launch, Bus. INs., Sept. 17, 1990, at 3, and Intelsat Blasts Martin Marietta in
Lawsuit Comments: Suit Over Intelsat 6 Communications Satellite Accident, SATELLITE
NEWS, Dec. 3, 1990, at 6.
2 Martin Marietta Corp. is a large aerospace firm that builds the Titan III
rocket.
3 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim at
14, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Intelsat, 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991) (No. MJG
90-1840) [hereinafter Martin Marietta Memorandum].
4 Intelsat claims Martin Marietta "miswired the launch vehicle so that the satellite did not and could not separate from the launch vehicle in response to commands sent by the Martin Marietta flight computer." Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims at 2, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Intelsat, 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991) (No. MJG 90-1840) [hereinafter Intelsat
Memorandum].
5 Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Satellite Org.,
763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 199 1),aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1992).
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nounced in the 1988 Amendments 6 (Amendments) to the
original Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (CSLA).7
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of
gross negligence claims, but upheld the dismissal of negligent and negligent misrepresentation claims based on the
sophistication of the parties.8
Almost ten years before the Martin Marietta mishap,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and the Reagan administration began to encourage the development of a private commercial space
launch industry.9 Following the first private launch of the
Conestoga I, President Reagan demanded and obtained
the CSLA, which consolidated and streamlined the commercial launch licensing procedure.10 In 1986, the Challenger disaster painfully exposed the unworkable
inconsistencies between NASA's original charter to develop space technology" and a more recent endeavor to
operate a viable commercial launch system.' 2 Only
6 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988) (public policy to encourage the struggling commercial launch industry).
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988).
a Martin Marietta v. International Communications Satellite Org., 978 F.2d 140
at 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
9 See infra part II.B.
10 See infra part IV.B.
I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1988)). The legislative history
accompanying the Act explains the original role of NASA:
The bill establishes a new civilian agency ... to develop a comprehensive program of research and development in aeronautical and
space sciences and related matters (including the study and solution
of the problems of manned and unmanned flight within and outside
the earth's atmosphere and the development, construction, testing,
and operation for research purposes of aircraft, missiles, satellites, and
other space vehicles).
H.R. REP. No. 1770, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3160, 3171 (emphasis added).
12 By 1970, NASA was launching more payloads for other organizations such as
COMSAT, the Department of Defense, and foreign corporations, than for itself.
ROGER E. BILSTEIN, ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE, A HISTORY OF THE NACA AND NASA,
1915-1990, at 98 (1989). The NASA appropriations bill for fiscal year 1984 reflects later efforts by both NASA and Congress to establish the Shuttle program as
a more economically self-sufficient enterprise.
Space Shuttle Marketing. Technical evolution of the space shuttle has
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months after the Challenger disaster, the Reagan Administration drastically curtailed commercial use of the Shuttle, giving birth to the private expendable launch vehicle
(ELV) industry.' 3 Finally, in 1988, to save a small and
shrinking group of private launch companies, Congress
adopted the Amendments to ameliorate the insurance and
liability problems plaguing the young industry.' 4 The district court in Martin Marietta relied on the Amendments to
dismiss all tort claims and deferred solely to the contract
between the parties as a basis of liability. 5 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the importance of the contract
in space launches, but reversed the dismissal of gross negligence. 16 This recent decision reviving gross negligence
may fly in the face of the legislative purpose of the
Amendments and send a chilling signal to the private
space launch community that tort may not be dead in
space. The impact of these recent court decisions is critical to a young industry estimated to generate 35 million
progressed sufficiently such that the development of the full potential for marketing the system needs to receive senior NASA management attention. The Committee [on Science and Technology]
believes that NASA should use the expertise of the private sector to
develop an effective marketing approach. Effective marketing of
space shuttle capabilities to commercial and foreign customers
should serve to decrease the government's share of operational
costs and assure that the shuttle system achieves the full potential
for which it was developed.
H.R. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983).
11 Statement by President Reagan, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1103-04 (Aug.
15, 1986) ("It has been determined ... that NASA will no longer be in the business of launching private satellites."). Two recent decisions issued by the United
States Claims Court denied recovery to plaintiff satellite owners seeking losses as
a result of the President's action. In Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v.
United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123 (1992), plaintiffs alleged damages of $288,454,000
after NASA announced that they could no longer launch ten Hughes satellites
under a launch services agreement signed by Hughes and the United States in
1985. Id. at 125. The court found that Hughes could expect no more than what
the contract offered and dismissed the contention that the President's change in
Shuttle policy amounted to a taking of property. Id. at 146. Similarly, in American Satellite Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 146 (1992), the court reaffirmed the
President's constitutional power to dictate space policy. Id. at 160.
11 See infra part IV.C.
15 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1334.
16 Martin Marietta, 978 F.2d at 145-46.
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jobs and a one trillion dollar global economy by the year

2010.17
This comment first explores the history of the space
launch industry, emphasizing U.S. efforts to encourage
the industry through deregulation and public policy pronouncements. Next, it traces the development of launchers' liability for damaged or lost payloads, from the strict
tort liability to the recent legislation mandating crosswaivers of liability among all launch participants. The
comment then discusses two congressional efforts to clear
major hurdles impeding the growth of the private space
launch industry: (1) consolidation of the licensing process
in the original CSLA and (2) elimination of space insurance and liability problems in the Amendments. Finally,
the comment considers the current state of regulation in
light of recent court decisions and offers final comments
on the future of the commercial space launch industry.
II.

NASA: FROM EXPLORATION TO
EXPLOITATION
A.

THE EARLY YEARS

NASA possessed complete control over domestic access
to space from the launch of the Explorer in 1958 until the
privately financed launch of the Conestoga I on September 9, 1982."8 During this time, space activities concentrated primarily on exploration and research of space,' 9
but the recent Shuttle program shifted its focus to the
commercial development of space. 20 This transition from
'17Diane

D. Edwards, Giving Space the Business, 128 Sci. NEWs 392, 392 (1985).

From 1957-1980, the nations of the world spent over $240 billion on space activities. Art Dula, Private Sector Activities in Outer Space, 19 INT'L LAW 159, 163 (1985).
Is Kim G. Yelton, Evolution, Organizationand Implementation of the CommercialSpace
Launch Act and Amendments of 1988, 4 J.L. & TECH. 117, 117 (1989).
19 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Commercial Space Activities: Their Growing Influence on
Space Law, 12 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 175, 175 (1987). "At that time, the commercial use of space was little more than the stuff of science fiction novels." Hughes
Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123, 125-26 (1992).
In the early 1980s, NASA began to sell space on the Shuttle to commercial
entities to help fund the young and extremely expensive program. Hughes, 26 Cl.
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government exploration to private exploitation created
many problems. For instance, NASA's original administrative purpose was to develop and perfect space technology and to allow private enterprise and the free markets
to assess the commercial usefulness of this technology. 2 '
The Shuttle program drastically shifted these priorities.
B.

A Two-FACED

SPACE SHU'rLE

NASA's Space Shuttle program began as a purely governmental endeavor. At the ceremonies following the return of Space Shuttle Columbia in 1982, President
Reagan announced a policy to encourage the domestic
commercial use of space. The Presidential Space Policy
declared the Shuttle to be the "primary space launch system for both national security and civil government missions."' 23 At the same time, the policy promised to
"provide a climate conducive to expanded private sector
24
investment and involvement in space activities.
NASA responded to Reagan's Presidential Directive
with its own Commercial Space Policy (NCSP). 25 The
NCSP identifies technical, financial and institutional risks
Ct. at 125. NASA attracted commercial clients with an attractive pricing plan and
the catchy advertising slogan "We Deliver." Id.
21 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1988); Barry
D. Johnson, Spacecraft Insurance-An Overview and Proposal, 36 FED'N INS. &
COUNS. Q 247, 267 (1986).

CORP.

22 United States Space Policy, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 872 (July 4, 1982)
[hereinafter Presidential Directive]. The directive was incorporated into national
executive policy by Presidential/National Security Council NSC-42, July 4, 1982
(Subject: Civil and Further National Space Policy). See James R. Myers, Federal

Government Regulation of Commercial Operations Using Expendable Launch Vehicles, 12 J.
SPACE L. 40, 40 n.l (1984).

Presidential Directive, supra note 22, at 873.
Id. at 874. Despite these earlier efforts to encourage development of a private commercial space launch industry, not until the events following the Challenger disaster did the market open up for private launch operators. The
President removed the Shuttle from commercial operations, which immediately
spawned a private ELV industry. See American Satellite Co. v. United States, 26
Cl. Ct. 146, 156 (1992).
25 Michele R. Lamontagne, Note, United States Commercial Space Policy: Impact on
23

24

Internationaland Domestic Law, 13 SYRACUSE J.

INT'L

L. & CoM. 129, 140 (1986)

(citing National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Commercial Use of Space
Policy (Oct. 29, 1984) [hereinafter NCSP]).
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to the private launch industry and proposes several initiatives to reduce these barriers.2 6 The implementation of
these initiatives achieves five underlying goals, which are:
(1) better communication with the private sector; (2) nonintervention in private investment decisions; (3) support
of private space projects that are more efficient than government operations; (4) investment in research and facilities to encourage private investment; and (5) assistance
with private sector endeavors offering potential benefits
for the nation. 27 Furthermore, NASA called for the elimination of any laws inconsistent with the policies of the
2a
NCSP.
Following the Presidential Directive and the NCSP, the
U.S. government tried to wean the private sector from the
launch services provided by NASA and the Air Force. In
1983 NASA discontinued its participation in the Delta and
Atlas/Centaur launch systems.2 9 Increased demand for
satellite launch services and an anticipated reduction in
the Shuttle commercial manifest led several entities, like
the French Ariane system, to begin aggressively marketing their launch services to U.S. companies. 3 0 The Shuttle's sophistication, which drove the cost of putting a one
pound payload into orbit from $3800 for the Saturn V to
over $6000 for the Shuttle, provided additional impetus
for new launch companies to enter the market.3 '
NASA, however, in apparent conflict with the PresidenId.
Id.
28 Id. at 149-50.
29 Space Commercialization: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 250, 285
(1983) [hereinafter House Space Commercialization Hearings]. Although McDonnell
Douglas builds the Delta launch system and General Dynamics builds the Atlas/
Centaur launch system, NASA actually purchased the launch vehicles, arranged
the payload manifest, and managed the entire launch activity. Douglas A. Heydon, InternationalTrade and Launch Pricing, 38 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 140, 140 (Apr.
1991). NASA pulled all of the participants together and directly billed the customer for the launch services. Id.
10House Space Commercialization Hearings, supra note 29, at 285.
3t EDWARD L. HUDGINS, AMERICA'S SPACE POLICY: COUNTDOWN TO MAJOR REFORMS, (Heritage Found. Rep. No. 826 (Apr. 25, 1991)).
26

27
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tial Directive of 1982 and their own policy of encouraging
private sector launch capabilities, continued marketing its
launch services to private vendors.3 2 One course, supported by the Presidential Directive and NASA's own
space policy, encouraged independent development of a
private launch industry and reserved the Shuttle for special missions.3 Another course, spurred on by the unique
capabilities of the Shuttle and NASA's strong desire to involve private industry in the Shuttle program, pressured
NASA to establish the commercial feasibility of the
34
Shuttle.
C.

CONESTOGA I: PIONEER OF THE PRIVATE INDUSTRY

On September 9, 1982, despite NASA's virtual monopoly on commercial space launches, a small group of entrepreneurs successfully launched a modified Minuteman I
second-stage missile, the Conestoga I, from Matagorda Island, Texas.3 5 The launch of the Conestoga I was not a
technological miracle, but it represented the first American launch that did not involve direct government participation. 6 This private commercial space effort revealed
the inadequacies of both the existing federal laws and the
agencies overseeing purely private launches. 7 Because
either NASA or the Air Force had handled all of the commercial launches to date, the particular controls for a
32 NASA's "We Deliver" campaign was a success and resulted in 24 commercial
launches between 1982 and 1986 with a backlog of 44 additional payloads at the
time of the Challenger disaster. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 128, NASA, concerned with
the competition from the European ELV company Arianespace, also instituted a
new pricing policy in 1985 to improve the "international competitive position of
the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 2466a(4) (1985); Charlotte Rothenberg, Space,
The Final Frontier: To Boldly Go Where No Lawyer Has Gone Before, 38 FED. BAR NEWS
&J. 127, 127 (April 1991).
" Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 129-32.
34 Lamontagne, supra note 25, at 149-50.
35 Stephen Harrigan, Mr. Hannah's Rocket, TEX. MONTHLY, Nov. 1982, at 168.
16 Francis H. Esposito, Jr., The Commercial Exploitation of Space, 25 A.F. L. REV.
159, 159 (1985).
37 Yelton, supra note 18, at 119. For a recount of the harrowing experience to
receive permission to launch the Conestoga I, see Dula, supra note 17, at 179-81.
A less legalese treatment of the launch appears in Harrigan, supra note 35, at 168.
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launch were found in launch service agreements executed
between the commercial user and the government, not in
federal legislation.3 8 No single law addressed a purely
private venture. To receive government approval to
launch the Conestoga I, Space Services, Inc. negotiated
with nearly twenty federal agencies.3 9 To alleviate these
inefficiencies, President Reagan issued an Executive Order designating the Department of Transportation (DOT)
as the lead agency responsible for licensing commercial
40
space ventures.
In response to the President's Order, Congress passed
the CSLA, which established the Office of Commercial
Space Transportation (OCST) and set forth guidelines to
regulate and license private space launch ventures. 4 ' The
new office attempted to deregulate and promote the industry while maintaining control over national security is42
sues, insurance requirements, and payload monitoring.
In the words of Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transportation, the commercial space launch industry was now
"open for business. 43

D.

THE CHALLENGER DISASTER AND BEYOND

The commercial space launch industry may have been
open for business, but the business was still run by NASA
38 See infra part III.D.
-9 Commercial Space Launch Act: Hearings on S.2931 Before the Subcomm. on Science,
Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 66 (1984) [hereinafter Senate CSLA Hearings].
40 Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (1984), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2465 note (1988).
4, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988). Some NASA officials opposed creation
of the OCST, fearing that a decrease in commercial users on the Shuttle would
lead to budget cuts in NASA programs. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 130. The tension
mounted as NASA strived to develop a commercially feasible launch system in the
Shuttle while the President and Congress sought to encourage the floundering
ELV industry. Id.
42 William L. Slover, Space Is the Place, 51 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 416, 416 (1984) (statement by Robert Ross, senior attorney in the DOT general counsel's office, speaking before an American Bar Association forum on space and aviation law).
41 Id. (statement by Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transportation, Expendable
Launch Vehicle Order Ceremony, The White House (Feb. 24, 1984)).
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and its rival, Arianespace.4 4 NASA had begun a banner
year, including a record fifteen scheduled flights, when
Challenger left the Kennedy Space Center launch pad on
January 28, 1986. 45 Moments later, a faulty 0-ring caused
a spectacular explosion, killing all seven astronauts and
ending NASA's misguided efforts to develop an economically viable commercial launch system.46 The Rogers
Commission, appointed by President Reagan, revealed
that NASA's decision-making process was unnecessarily
encumbered by commercial pressures to meet ambitious
launch schedules. 47 The accident sparked immediate executive action, which shifted the burden of commercial
space development to struggling private entrepreneurs
and their expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).48
14 Heydon, supra note 29, at 140. By the end of 1985 the young Ariane program already boasted a backlog of 41 launch contracts, many with customers
outside of Europe. Id.
45 Lamontagne, supra note 25, at 149.
46 David E. Sanger, Loss a FurtherBlow to NASA's Business Efforts, N.Y. TIMES,Jan.
30, 1986, at AI9.
41 Lamontagne, supra note 25, at 152. The Challenger explosion highlighted
the inadequacy of the program as a dependable and cost-effective commercial
launch provider. Id. Although the original purpose of the Space Shuttle was to
provide a launch system for both national security and civil government missions,
the Shuttle program felt increasing pressure to prove its economic viability as a
commercial carrier up until the Challenger disaster. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT

82 (June 6, 1986).

The Rogers Commission reported that emphasis on "operational" as opposed to
"developmental" goals caused increasing pressure to launch, sometimes sacrificing safety concerns. Id. at 164-65. Both NASA officials and employees of Morton
Thiokol expressed concern that the "O-rings" in the solid rocket boosters may fail
if temperatures reached below 53 degrees Fahrenheit. Id. at 82. The temperature
at the time the Challenger left the launch pad was 37 degrees. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct.
at 129.
48 Heydon, supra note 29, at 140. The President stated: The private sector, with
its ingenuity and cost effectiveness, will be playing an increasingly important role
in the American space effort. Free enterprise corporations will become a highly
competitive method of launching commercial satellites and doing those things
which do not require a manned presence in space. Statement by President Reagan, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1104 (Aug. 15, 1986). Following the Chal-

lenger incident and the executive pronouncement severely limiting commercial
launches on the Shuttle, the U.S. government discovered the difficulty involved in
transferring launch services to the private industry. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 131. The
President's Economic Policy Council categorized the 44 remaining commercial
payloads, but only 20 qualified as national security, foreign policy, or Shuttle-
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Ironically, the Shuttle disaster provided opportunities
for the private sector to enter the launch market, but at
the same time discouraged participation by increasing
space insurance premiums.4 9 To add to this dilemma, the
European Space Agency's Ariane rocket fleet already offered dependable and relatively inexpensive launch services, which lured several American companies away from
domestic operations." The Shuttle explosion may have
opened the door to private industry, but a host of
problems remained.5
In the aftermath of the Challenger incident, President
Reagan issued a strong directive which severely limited
commercial access to the government space launch systems.5 The President declared that "[c]ommercial and
foreign payloads will not be launched on government
owned or operated ELV systems except for national security or foreign policy reasons. '5 3 In addition, commercial projects could use the Shuttle "only where those
payloads must be man-tended, require the unique capabilities of the [Shuttle], or ... [when needed] for national
security or foreign policy purposes. 54
With the loss of the Challenger from the four orbiter
fleet, the U.S. space program reevaluated its position in
the commercial market and proposed commercial ELVs as
an alternative to the Shuttle.5 5 For over thirty years
unique payloads earning a spot on later Shuttle flights. Id. at 132. NASA bumped
the remaining unqualified payloads from the Shuttle manifest. Id..
49 Leonard Sloane, The Shuttle Explosion: Cost of Insurance In Space May Rise, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 29, 1986, at A10. The Challenger tragedy dramatically rocked the
space insurance industry, but mishaps with two Titan 34D's, two Arianes, a Delta,
and an Atlas/Centaur in the same period also contributed to skyrocketing premiums. Heydon, supra note 29, at 140.
50 See Sanger, supra note 46, at A19.
5' See, e.g., infra notes 149-160 and accompanying text. "The nation faced an
acute shortage of launch capacity, created by a policy that had fostered reliance on
the now-grounded Shuttle fleet, and exacerbated by a virtual absence of commercial launch providers." Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 9.
52 Yelton, supra note 18, at 119 (citing Presidential Directive on National Space
Policy Fact Sheet (Feb. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Reagan Directive]).
.53Id.
54

Id.

55 Id.
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NASA worked to perfect the design of ELVs, which are
cheaper and less complex than the Shuttle. 56 ELVs offer a
high reliability rate, proven by thousands of commercial
and military launches.
The technology of ELVs was
within reach of the private sector, but questions regarding
liability and insurance continued to plague industry
growth.I

E.

INSURING THE NEW SPACE ENTREPRENEUR

While the space launch industry experienced dramatic
changes in the late 70s and 80s, the space insurance business tried to keep pace. 9 Government space endeavors
typically rely on self-insurance by assuming the high risks
of a space launch.60 The U.S. government often chooses
to absorb any losses arising under the Federal Tort
Claims Act 6' or under one of the various international
treaties promulgated by the United Nations and ratified
by the Senate. 62 The emergence of the severely underfunded space entrepreneur, however, created a necessity
for space insurance.63 Space operations are extremely
costly, and private enterprise is neither willing nor capable of bearing the cost of losses resulting from a space
launch mishap. 64 As the private space launch industry
grew, the space insurance industry also grew to meet the
56 Irene Atney-Yurdin, Insuring Third Party Liabilityfor Commercial Outer Space Enterprises, 3 INT'L PROP. INv. J. 325, 326 (1987).
57 Id. at 326-27.
58 REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION ON THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1988,
Doc.

S.

No. 593, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1988) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
-9 See Johnson, supra note 21, at 248-53 (discussing the development of satellite
insurance coverage).
- Id. at 247.
6- 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the government waives its sovereign immunity and becomes liable for its torts or the torts of
its agents under local law in the place where the tort occurred. Id.; see W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984).
62

See infra part III.B.

63 Johnson, supra note 21, at 247.
64 Over a span of 21 months during 1984 and 1985, space launch and in-orbit
losses involved seven satellites with combined insured values of approximately
$600 million. Satellite Insuranceand Space Commercialization:Hearings Before the Senate
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escalating need for financial protection.6 5
Private companies require insurance to cover thirdparty losses resulting from launch activities. 66 Under the
various international treaties, third-party liability attaches
to the launching state.67 For this reason, the United
States traditionally compels private commercial enterprises to indemnify the government from potential thirdparty claims. 68 As an example, a typical NASA launch
agreement requires a user to obtain a certain level of
third-party liability insurance. 9
Satellite owners also require insurance to cover property losses.70 Property insurance for satellites developed
in discrete steps with each new type of insurance covering
more aspects of the life of the satellite. The first satellite
insurance policy, written in 1965 for Communications
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), 7 ' covered damage only
to the satellite prior to liftoff. 72 COMSAT purchased an
expanded insurance policy in 1969 for its Intelsat III
satellites to cover any losses incurred within forty-five
days following the launch.73 In 1975 RCA purchased the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1985) [hereinafter Senate Space Insurance Hearings].
65 Rod Margo, Some Aspects of Insuring Satellites, 681 INS. L.J. 555, 556 (Oct.
1979).
6 Johnson, supra note 21, at 253.
67 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
openedfor signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention].
- Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Managing Tort Liability Risks in the Era of the Space Shuttle, 7J. SPACE L. 121, 122 (1979).
69Ralph L. Kissick, Commercial Space Launch Contracts:Disputes and Remedies, 4 J.L.
& TECH. 31, 38 (1989).
70 Johnson, supra note 21, at 248.
71 COMSAT is a quasi-private organization authorized to "plan, initiate, construct, own, manage and operate ... a commercial communications satellite system." 47 U.S.C. § 735(a)(1) (1988). COMSAT operates for profit, but the
President appointed the incorporators and three of the 15 directors. Id. §§ 731733.
72 Margo, supra note 65, at 556.
71 Id. at 556 n.4. The policy insured the loss of one satellite out of a series of
five, with a one satellite deductible. The definition of loss in satellite coverage is
crucial and typically involves physical damage and failure to achieve a specifically
defined orbital injection. Id.

808

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

first satellite life insurance policy to cover one of its
SATCOM satellites for a period of three years, with a possibility of renewal.74 The satellite insurance companies
continue to offer more comprehensive policies, but the
soaring cost of this insurance threatens future commercial
developments in space.75
III.

WHO'S TO BLAME?

The liability of commercial space launchers for customers' property losses involves several competing theories of
recovery. Following traditional tort law, a commercial
launch company may be strictly liable for property loss,
since a space launch may constitute an abnormally dangerous activity. 76 On the other hand, international treaty
obligations suggest an approach to liability that applies a
negligence standard to commercial launch companies.77
In contrast, governmental space launch activities frequently limit recovery to the specific provisions in the
launch services contract. 78 Finally, public policy suggests
additional limitations on the liability exposure of the
fledgling commercial launch industry.79
A.

STRICTLY TORTS

A person is strictly liable for damage caused by a thing
or activity that is unduly dangerous, considering the inappropriateness of the thing or activity in the immediate surroundings.80 To date, no American court has applied this
doctrine of strict liability espoused in Rylands v. Fletcher to
the carriage of goods into outer space. Several decisions,
however, imposed strict liability on persons conducting
ground tests of rocket motors and test firings of rockets
74 Johnson,

supra note 21, at 251-52 n.36.

Id. at 267-68.
76 See infra part III.A.
77 See infra part III.B.
78 See infra part III.D.
75

79 See infra part IV.C. for a discussion of the public policy to promote the commercial space launch industry.
0 See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 340 (H.L. 1868).
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within the atmosphere.8 ' In the 1930's, the developing
airline industry limited strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to damage to third-parties and property
on the ground. 2 Even today, airplane operators are not
strictly liable for harm caused to passengers and goods on
the aircraft. 3 By analogy, and relying solely on common
law tort principles, commercial space launchers are not
strictly liable for damage to or loss of a customer's
payload. 4
B.

NEGLIGENCE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

Beginning with the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik on October 4, 1957, the international community recognized the need for laws governing activities in outer
space.8 5 To achieve this, the United Nations formed the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in 1959 to draft and adopt treaties governing
the use of space.86 As a permanent body of the United
Nations, COPUOS promulgates major space treaties, the
most recent being the Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(Moon Agreement). 7 Each successive offering of
81An excellent discussion of these cases appears in Charles L. Deem, Liability of
Private Space TransportationCompanies to Their Customers, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 340, 350-

353 (1984) (citing Berg v. Reaction Motors Division, 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962);
Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967); and H.L. Properties,
Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D. Fla. 1971)).
82 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. b (1938).
Is A comment to the more recent RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states:
An operator or owner of an aircraft is subject to strict liability under
this Section only for physical harm to land, or to persons or chattels
on the ground. He is not subject to liability under this Section to
persons themselves participating in aviation, such as the crew or passengers of a falling plane, or the owner of property on it or to persons on another plane which was struck by the defendant's plane.
Different tort rules govern his liabilities to them.
OF TORTS § 520A cmt. e (1976).
- Deem, supra note 81, at 354.
85 See S. Neil Hosenball, Relevant Treaties Governing Space Activities, 38 FED.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

BAR

NEWS &J. 128, 128 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter Hosenball Treaties].
86 G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959).
87 Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and Other

810

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

COPUOS attracts fewer ratifying countries, and the
United States probably will never ratify the Moon Agreement because of the chilling effect on commercial exploitation of space resources.88 The earlier and widely
accepted treaties, however, still play an important role in
establishing international liability for space launch
mishaps.89
The Outer Space Treaty9" attaches international responsibility for national activities in space, whether governmental
or
nongovernmental. 9 1
The
Treaty
contemplates private space activities and requires the
states to assume full responsibility, regardless of their exercise of control over these activities. 92 The Treaty, however, fails to specify a standard to determine the
responsibility of a launching state or a procedure to compensate the aggrieved party for damages.
The Liability Convention defines more clearly the responsibility of the launching state arising from Article VII
of the Outer Space Treaty and outlines a specific procedure to compensate injured parties. Under the Convention, individuals have no standing to bring claims against
foreign governments, but must rely on their governments
to pursue relief.93 The Convention defines a launching
state as one that "launches or procures the launching of a
space object" or one "from whose territory or facility a
space object is launched. ' 94 A launching state is absoCelestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter
Moon Agreement].
88 Dula, supra note 17, at 177.
89 See Hosenball Treaties, supra note 85, at 130-31 (providing a brief synopsis of
existing space treaties and the present status of acceptance by countries).
9 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, openedfor
signature Oct. 10 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
9' Id. art. VI-VII, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
92 Id.
93 Stanton Eigenbrodt, Out to Launch: Private Remediesfor Outer Space Claims, 55J.
AIR L. & CoM. 185, 196 (1989).
Liability Convention, supra note 67, art. I, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at
189.
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lutely liable for damages caused by its space object on the
surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight.9 5 In all
other cases, the liability is based on fault. 96 This two-tier
standard of liability established in the Convention suggests negligence as one possible theory of recovery for
losses to a customer's payload caused by a commercial
space launcher. 97 If the damage from an American launch
occurs in the United States, then the Liability Convention
does not apply, 98 and the injured party must find a remedy in traditional tort law or, if the defendant is a government agency, under the Federal Tort Claims Act.99
Actual recovery under the provisions of the Liability
Convention for third-party claims is very rare. From the
launch of Sputnik in 1957 to 1984, the space nations have
placed over 17,000 objects into Earth orbit. 00 All orbiting objects eventually fall back to earth. Normally, this
space debris burns up on reentry with some notable exceptions. For example, inJanuary 1975, the second stage
of an expended Saturn V rocket accidently splashed down
in the Atlantic Ocean near the Azores. Similarly, the remains of the eighty ton Skylab littered the Indian Ocean
and certain remote sections of western Australia.' 0 ' The

Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite crash in Canada, however, is
the only incident involving liability payments for damage
to persons or property caused by a falling space object. 0 2
9- Id. art. II, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at 189.
96 Id. art. III, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at 190.
97 Deem, supra note 81, at 355.
98 Liability Convention, supra note 67, art. VII, 24 U.S.T. at 2395, 961 U.N.T.S.
at 191.
- Esposito, supra note 36, at 162.
00 William F. Causey, Insurance Coveragefor the Space Industry, 20 TRIAL 43, 43

(Aug. 1984). By 1984 the geostationary orbit 22,300 miles above the equator
contained over 5600 objects. Craig Covault, Station Likely to Be Hit By Debris, Avi.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 17, 1984, at 16.
10, A litigious individual filed suit in a district court in Ohio to enjoin the return
of Skylab. S. Neil Hosenball, NASA and the Practiceof Space Law, 13J. SPACE L. 1, 6
(1985).
102 Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage
Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 899 (1979) [hereinafter Cana-

dian Claim]; see Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International Liability for Damage
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A portion of the five ton surveillance satellite containing
an on-board nuclear power source survived reentry and
scattered debris in Canada's remote Northwest Territories. 0 3 The Soviets paid three million Canadian dollars in
full settlement of the claim.' 04 The Cosmos 954 incident
suggests the remote possibility of damage to third-parties
resulting from launch activities, but the more likely, and
cumulatively more devastating, financial losses are to the
payload itself.'0 5
COPUOS also ratified other space treaties with only minor impact on commercial launch operations. The Registration Convention created a national registry of space
objects. 0 6 The Rescue Agreement implements Article V
of the Outer Space Treaty and details the procedures and
obligations in the event an astronaut or space object lands
outside the territory of the launching state. 0 7 In addition,
the Moon Agreement prohibits a territorial claim of the
Moon by any nation, 0 8 provides free and open access to
the Moon by all nations, 0 9 and creates an organizational
framework for regulating the development of space resources." t0 The International Telecommunications Convention I ' and the Agreement Establishing the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
Caused by Space Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954
Incident, 8 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 255, 278 (1984).
103 Canadian Claim, supra note 102, at 902-03.
104 Canada's Claim Against the U.S.S.R. Arising Out of the Cosmos 954 Incident. The Claim's Settlement, Communique No. 27, Department of External Affairs, Apr. 2, 1981.
105Intelsat sought $400 million in damages from Martin Marietta for the loss of
a single satellite. Hofmann, supra note 1, at 3; Martin Marietta Memorandum,
supra note 3, at 15.
106 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signatureJan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
107 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, openedfor signature Apr. 22, 1968,
19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
108 Moon Agreement, supra note 87, art. XI, para. 2, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
109 Id. art. VI, para. 1, 18 I.L.M. at 1436.
1o Id. art. XI, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
III International Telecommunications Convention, openedfor signature Oct. 25,
1973, Malaga-Torremolinos, 28 U.S.T. 2495.
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(Intelsat)112 also affect commercial activities in space, but
do not address launcher liability.
The collection of international agreements executed by
the United States affects private corporations involved in
launch activities in three ways." 3 First, the treaties
adopted by COPUOS and ratified by the United States are
considered self-executing and become the positive law of
the country. 114 Second, the United States compels corporations to comply with international law through NASA
launch agreements or through the licensing procedures of
the CSLA." 15 For example, the United States imposes
substantial restrictions regarding indemnification and insurance upon corporate space activities in response to the
liability established by the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention." 6 Finally, the two-tier approach in
the Liability Convention establishes negligence as the
leading theory of recovery for losses 17to customer property
caused by the launching company.'
C.

THE GOVERNMENT STEPS IN

Under the Liability Convention, commercial launcher
liability for customer losses lies in negligence, but section
308 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act (NASAct) may also impact the liability of launching activities."' Congress passed section
308 of the NASAct in 1980 to give NASA the authority to
112 Agreement Establishing the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, openedfor signature Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813.
I's JamesJ. Trimble, The InternationalLaw of Outer Space and its Effect on Commercial
Space Activity, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 521, 561-62 (1984).
14
U.S. CONST. art. VI (the Supremacy Clause); see Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing,
and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation.").
115 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (d)(7) (1988) (prime directive of NASA is "[c]ooperation by
the United States with other nations"). The amended CSLA considers the obligations of the United States created by the various international treaties through the
insurance and indemnity provisions. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).

116 Mossinghoff, supra note 68, at 122.

Deem, supra note 81, at 355.
Il National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-48, 93 Stat. 345 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2458b, 2459, 2473 (1988)).
1,7
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insure its users and provide indemnity for third-party
claims in excess of the insurance limits." t9 Section 308,
however, permits NASA to limit indemnification "to
claims resulting from other than the actual negligence or
willful misconduct of the user."'' 2 0 NASA does not act as
an insurer, but as an agent purchasing insurance when
available and providing this coverage to users.' 2 ' This arrangement allows the user to purchase insurance at a reasonable cost to cover most losses, while the United States
receives indemnification for all but the most serious incidents. 22 Section 308 therefore encourages corporations
to enter the industry, but also allows the United States to
comply with its international obligations. 123 Congress
eventually adopted this government indemnification concept of section 308 in the Amendments to the CSLA. 24
D.

THE CONTRACT Is KING

In addition to the insurance requirements under section 308 of the NASAct, the government often mandates
the signing of launch service or launch facility agreements. 25 These agreements shift liability established by
international treaties to the private commercial
enterprise.
Public policy against adhesion contracts often prohibits
a party from limiting its liability. 26 Courts define a con119 Id.
120

§ 308 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2458b (1988)).

NASAct, supra note 118, § 308(b).

Johnson, supra note 21, at 261.
Id. at 261-62.
123 Id. at 253, 261-62.
12,4 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615(b)(1) (1988).
25 Both NASA and the Air Force employ model agreements to assure international obligations are met and to allow further risk allocation. Furthermore, governmental agencies often inject provisions into these contracts that support
certain public policies. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 723 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (a launch services agreement providing that the parties must agree to a no-fault, no subrogation, interparty waiver of liability to "contribute to the common goal of meaningful
exploration of outer space.").
126 Vera Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20
AM.J. COMP. L. 53, 54-55 (1972).
121
122
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tract of adhesion as a form contract imposed by a party
27
with superior bargaining power over a weaker party,
which generally arise in consumer, rather than commercial, settings. 28 Considering the amount of money involved and the sophistication of parties, a commercial
normally does not constitute an
launch service agreement
29
1
contract.
adhesion
Since parties in the commercial space launch arena
freely allocate their liability through contracts, it is crucial
to clearly define the participants, the types of risks involved, and the means to allocate those risks. The participants include: (1) the launch service provider, (2) the
customer or owner of the payload to be launched, (3) the
launch facility provider, and (4) the various contractors
and subcontractors.13 0 The participants face both a risk to
their own property and employees and a risk of legal liability for3 loss or injury to other participants or thirdparties.'1
The allocation of these risks appears primarily in two
agreements. A launch facility agreement often requires
the launch service provider to indemnify the government
for property damage and third-party liability in return for
the use of the government-owned and operated launch facility.' 3 2 In contrast, a launch service agreement embodies all of the rights and obligations between the launch
provider and the 3customer, including inter-participant
3
waivers of claims.'
NASA adopted a similar launch service agreement for
commercial users at Cape Canaveral, Florida and Wallops
Island, Virginia, 134 while the Air Force drafted a model
Id.
Richard P. Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition and Its
Application to Banking, 11 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 297, 303 (1978).
- Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
1soPeter D. Nesgos, The Challenges Facing the PrivatePractitioner:Liability and Insurance Issues in Commercial Space Transportation, 4 J.L. & TECH. 21, 23 (1989).
is, Id.
132 Id. at 24.
127
128

1ss Id. at 23-24.
1s4

Kissick, supra note 69, at 32. Although NASA creates a new contract for each
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contract for users of the Patrick and Vandenberg Air
Force bases.' 3 5 A typical NASA launch service agreement
requires all parties, including the U.S. government, to execute mutual covenants not to sue. 136 All participants in
the launch must hold each other harmless for any dam37
ages to the payload, launch vehicle, or launch facilities.
NASA requires this cross-waiver of liability for several
policy reasons.' 31 First, NASA hopes to encourage use of
the Shuttle by eliminating the user's concerns over massive liability claims arising from damage to the Shuttle or
other payloads.' 39 Second, NASA realizes the difficulty to
the insurance market in covering space ventures without
these cross-waiver provisions. 40 Finally, NASA believes
mutual covenants encourage participation of small scientific users, such as small university researchers, who would
otherwise be unable to carry the liability insurance
needed to cover the risk of damage on launch.' 4 ' In
amending the CSLA in 1988, Congress adopted many of
customer, a typical launch service agreement is NASA's Martin Marietta Commercial Titan, Inc. contract of Oct. 1988. For a good discussion of this contract see id.
at 32-42. The Appalachian court discusses in detail the exculpatory clauses in a
NASA launch services agreement with Western Union. Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr.
at 720-25. The Hughes case also discusses the unique contractual relationship between a customer and NASA. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United
States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123, 132-46 (1992).
"15 Kissick, supra note 69, at 32; Air Force's Model Expendable Launch Vehicle
Commercialization Agreement, Revision Two, July 1989 [hereinafter Air Force
Model Agreement].
1.6 Sheila Footer, Legal Issues and Answers for Commercial Users of the Space Shuttle,
13 TRANS. LJ. 87, 93 (1983).
I7 Id.
138Johnson, supra note 21, at 256. The Shuttle's capability to carry several
satellites concerned customers since they then had to consider the potential liability for causing damage to other expensive payloads. Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr. at
724. NASA, therefore, required all launch participants to sign a no-fault, no subrogation interparty waiver of liability. Id. at 724 n.6 (quoting the full text of the
interparty waiver of liability in the NASA/Western Union launch services
agreement).
139See Mossinghoff, supra note 68, at 123.
140 S. Neil Hosenball, The Space Shuttle in Perspective, 9J. SPACE L. 69, 72 (1981).
141 Mossinghoff, supra note 68, at 123. Many small scientific payloads could fly
on the Shuttle for $10,000, but additional insurance costs in the absence of crosswaiver provisions may exceed $50,000. See Robert A. Tepfer, Allocation of Tort
Liability Risks in the Space Shuttle Program, 23 A.F. L. REV. 208, 213 (1982).
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the provisions in a typical NASA lauch service
agreement,
142
liability.
of
including the cross-waivers
IV.

THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT
A. A

RACE TO PRIVATIZATION

NASA's substantial efforts to reduce the liability exposure of its customers through the launch service agreement did not apply to purely private launches. 143 As a
result, private industry still faced two major hurdles in the
race to privatization. The first hurdle, illustrated by the
difficulties surrounding the Conestoga I launch, concerned the confusing state of piecemeal regulation imposed on purely private launch activities. 144 In 1984
Congress responded with the original CSLA to consoli145
date all licensing authority in a single regulatory body.
The second hurdle, aggravated greatly by the Challenger
disaster and other commercial rocket launch failures, was
skyrocketing space insurance rates and continued concern
for the exposure of private industry to potentially massive
liability. 146 Adopting many of NASA's ideas, Congress acted quickly by amending the CSLA in 1988 to include limits on required insurance, government indemnification for
47
large claims, and mandatory cross-waivers of liability.'
B.

HURDLE ONE AND THE ORIGINAL ACT

A collection of vague international treaties and a nonstandard set of government launch contracts controlled
the duties and obligations of parties in launches before
49 U.S.C. app. § 2615(a)(I)(C)-(D) (1988).
A launch provider, operating a purely private launch, drafts its own launch
service agreement.
'44 See infra part IV.B. and accompanying text for the regulatory nightmare of
the Conestoga I.
14-49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988).
146 Andrew Ritholz, Internationaland Domestic Regulation of Private Launching Ventures, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 135, 172 (1984). "[E]xorbitant insurance requirements,
severe government review of price and service offerings, standards rejecting relatively high risk practices, or stringent disclosure of results requirements may lead
some entrepreneurs to abstain from participation." Id.
14,49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
142
14,
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the Conestoga I. A purely private activity would be subject to the same international obligations, together with
the regulations of a host of agencies, having only indirect
control on launch operations. 48 Space Services, Inc., in a
valiant effort to abide by all treaty obligations and agency
regulations, waded through a regulatory morass before
launching the Conestoga I in 1982.149
The players in the Conestoga I game read like a laundry
list of major governmental agencies. The Department of
State, in addition to overseeing the government's obligations under several international treaties, exercised its authority under the Arms Export Control Act' 50 by
requiring a permit for the export of rockets, spacecraft,
space electronics, and guidance equipment. 15 ' DOT
maintained control of airspace over 14,500 feet and therefore required an exemption for rocket travel pursuant to
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.152 DOT also required
launch participants to provide detailed information concerning the launch within twenty-four to forty-eight hours
of liftoff.'5 3 The U.S. Coast Guard, exercising authority
under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 5 4 kept vessels
away from the launch site and trajectory and oversaw the
transportation of the rocket from the Texas mainland to
Matagorda Island. 155 The Conestoga I launch also required temporary licenses to operate the telemetry, tracking, and self-destruct systems over certain frequencies
allocated by the FCC under the Federal Communications
Act of 1934.156 In addition, NASA, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the

148
Allen D. Webber, Launching the Rocket Industry in the United States: Domestic Regulation of Private Expendable Launch Vehicles, 50J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 9-22 (1984).
149 Yelton, supra note 18, at 119-25; Webber, supra note 148, at 9-22.
-5 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796d (1988).
151 See Art Dula, Export Controls Affecting Space Operations, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 927,
944-47 (1986).
152 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1988).
153 14 C.F.R. § 101.25 (1992).
154 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1988).
'55 Id. §§ 1223(c), 1225.
'56 Yelton, supra note 18, at 123 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988)).
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Navy, the North American Aerospace Defense Command,
the IRS, the CIA, and even the U.S. Treasury justified
some measure of control over the Conestoga I launch.' 5 7
All told, the regulatory approvals necessary to launch
the Conestoga I concerned eighteen federal agencies and
twenty-two different statutes or regulatory guidelines. 58
The approval process took six months to complete at a
cost of $250,000.1'9 The government imposed this "unnecessary and potentially crippling regulatory barrier" for
a simple test flight carrying a water payload. 60 Accordingly, the Secretary of Transportation urged Congress
and the President to "streamline and facilitate all clearance requirements, eliminate any unnecessary and overlapping regulations and take steps to promote and
to be a multi-billion dollar
encourage what promises
16 1
space launch business."'
The CSLA codifies the major policies of Executive Order No. 12,465,62 which designated DOT as the lead
agency for commercial space launch regulation and implemented a one-stop licensing procedure. 63 The CSLA attempts to relieve the problems created by the brick wall of
"overlapping inter-agency jurisdiction" found in the Conestoga I launch. 164 The Executive Order empowered
DOT to act as the center for documentation of license ap1 65
plications, but did not empower DOT to issue licenses.
Congress passed the CSLA to insure that the clear policy
Id. at 123-25.
158Senate CSLA Hearings, supra note 39, at 66.
159 Id.
10 Webber, supra note 148, at 26.
Expendable
161 Statement by Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transportation,
Launch Vehicle Order Ceremony, The White House (Feb. 24, 1984).
162 Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (Feb. 24, 1984), reprinted'in 42
U.S.C. § 2465 note (1988).
163 Id.; 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988). The success of DOT in deregulating other modes of transportation may have weighed heavily in the President's
decision. Ross, The Department of Transportation'sNew Role in Commercializing Space
Transportation, 1 ABA FORUM ON AIR AND SPACE LAW 5, 5 (1984).
164 Yelton, supra note 18, at 137.
165 Exec. Order No. 12,465 §§ 2(a)-(h), 3 C.F.R. 163 (1984), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2465 note (1988).
157
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of the Executive Order would continue across administrations and to affirmatively grant exclusive authority to the
Secretary of Transportation to issue commercial launch
66
licenses.
The CSLA applies to both commercial launches on government-operated systems and commercial launches, like
the Conestoga I, in which the government does not participate. 167 In addition, the CSLA eliminates the question
of whether a regulatory agency can control the activities
of the space launch industry based solely on a collection
of international treaties and agreements. 168 In legislating
the CSLA, Congress still gave "serious consideration to
the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and the extent of U.S. liability for launch-related activities pursuant to international
law and international obligations."'169 The purpose of the
CSLA is:
(1) to promote economic growth and entrepreneurial activity through utilization of the space environment for
peaceful purposes;
(2) to encourage the United States private sector to provide launch vehicles and associated launch services by simplifying and expediting the issuance and transfer of
commercial launch licenses and by facilitating and encouraging the utilization of Government-developed space
technology; and
(3) to designate an executive department to oversee and
coordinate the conduct of commercial launch operations,
to issue and transfer commercial launch licenses authorizing such activities, and to protect public health and safety,
safety of property, and the national security interests
and
70
the foreign policy interests of the United States.
Pursuant to the power to "encourage, facilitate, and
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2606 (1988).
Id. § 2605(a). The CSLA does not, however, apply to launches of government payloads on government systems. Id. § 2620(c).
- Esposito, supra note 36, at 161.
169 S. REP.
No. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5328, 5336.
170 49 U.S.C. app. § 2602 (1988).
167
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promote commercial space launches by the private sector," ' 7' the Secretary of Transportation established the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST). 7 2
OCST "exercise[s] the Secretary's authority to license
and otherwise regulate commercial space launch activities
and ...discharge[s] the Secretary's responsibility to encourage, facilitate and promote commercial space
launches by the United States private sector."' I 7 This
new governing body publishes regulations establishing
procedures to review and authorize commercial launch
activities. 174 OCST licensing contains two separate procedures. First, the Safety Review concerns the safety and
reliability issues of the applicant's vehicle and launch facilities.175 Second, the Mission Review addresses the foreign
policy and national security interests impacted by each
76
launch.
OCST actively pursues other work to insure the success
of the commercial launch industry. For example, the primary function of OCST is to license and regulate commercial launches. 77 Under the auspices of DOT,
however, the agency also conducts safety research and
oversees possible development of privately owned
78
spaceports. 1
The congressional findings in the CSLA declare that
the private sector is capable of providing private satellite
launch services, which would complement the services
available from the government.' 79 To this end, the
,71Id. § 2604(a)(1).
172 14 C.F.R. § 401.1 (1992). OCST began operation on November 16, 1983,
but the Secretary of Transportation did not officially establish the agency until
February 24, 1984. Myers, supra note 22, at 43. One commentator concludes
that the establishment of the OCST "is the most appropriate method of streamlining the regulatory process." Webber, supra note 148, at 47.
17s14 C.F.R. § 401.3 (1992).
174 Id.
175
Id. § 411.5.
176Id. § 411.7.
177Id. § 411.1.
178Stephanie Lee-Miller, Licensing and Regulating U.S. Commercial Space Launches,
4J.L. & TECH. 45, 46 (1989).
17949 U.S.C. app. § 2601(4) (1988).
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United States encourages development of the commercial
launch industry and commits to regulate these activities
only to comply with obligations under international treaties and "to protect the public health and safety, safety of
property, and national security interests and foreign policy interests of the United States."' 80
Under the CSLA, the Secretary of Transportation encourages, facilitates, and promotes the commercial launch
industry, consults with other agencies over the licensing
requirements for commercial space ventures and maintains a system of licensing procedure that is fair and equitable to all applicants.' 8 " The Secretary can issue,18 2
transfer, 8 3 modify, 184 suspend,"' and revokerS8 licenses.
In addition, the Secretary may prescribe new requirements, 8 7 waive applicable laws and regulations on a caseby-case basis, 8 and issue any other regulations to carry
out the purposes of the CSLA. 8 9 Furthermore, to enforce the provisions of the CSLA,9'° the Secretary can investigate and seize any objects, records, or reports subject
to the CSLA,' 9 ' require the presence of observers at any
production facilities, assembly sites, launch sites, or
launch facilities 19 2 and assess and enforce civil penalties
for violations of the CSLA. '3
The CSLA also encourages, through lease, sale, or
other transaction, the private use of government launch
facilities and services. 94 The price for the use of this
180 Id. § 2601(7).
181

Id. § 2604(a).

182

Id. § 2606.

183 Id.

- Id. § 2609(b).
§ 2609(a).

185Id.
186

Id.

Id. § 2607(b).
188Id. § 2607(c).
189 Id. § 2612.
I" Id. § 2616(a).
187

19,
192

Id. § 2616(b)(2)(B).

Id. § 2616(b)(2)(A).

193Id. § 2618.
'94Id. § 2614(a).
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property is the "fair market value."' 95 In cases other than
sale or transaction in lieu of sale, the responsible government agency can only charge for direct costs," which include wear and tear on property and salaries of U.S.
civilian and contractor personnel. 96
All launches under the jurisdiction of the CSLA must
obtain a launch license. 97 Generally, the CSLA requires
no other license, 198 but the Secretary of Commerce and
the FCC retain additional licensing authority over certain
satellites.' 99 The applicant must properly identify the
payload and obtain the necessary payload license before
receiving

launch

authorization. 20 0

The

Secretary

of

Transportation prescribes all application procedures 20 '
and provides notice for delays in processing applications.2 °2 Whenever the Secretary suspends, revokes, or
modifies a license, the affected party has a right to notice, 20 3 hearing, 20 4 determination on the record, 20 5 and ad-

ministrative and judicial reviews. 0 6
Finally, the CSLA's jurisdiction flows directly from the
international responsibility established in the Outer Space
Treaty and the Liability Convention.20 7 In signing these
treaties, the federal government is ultimately responsible
for damage to property and harm to citizens of other
countries 20 8 and, therefore, has a duty to insure the safety
of all space launch ventures. Consequently, the CSLA requires that the licensee have liability insurance "at least in
such an amount as is considered by the Secretary to be
195Id. § 2614(b).
IN Id.
197Id.

§ 2605(a)(1).

198Id. § 2605(c)(1).
-9 Id. §§ 2605(b)(1), (c)(2).
sooId.

§ 2605(b)(1).

200

Id. § 2608(a).
Id. § 2608(b).
Id. §§ 2608(b), 2609(d).

204

Id. § 2611(a).

201
202

205
2-

207

Id.
Id. § 2611(b).
Id. § 2620(d).

-o Outer Space Treaty, supra note 90, art. VII.
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necessary for such launch or operation, considering the
international obligations of the United States. ' 20 9 The
Secretary prescribes the amount of insurance required after consulting with the Attorney General and appropriate
agencies. 2 10 The CSLA does not establish limits on liability insurance, nor does it address government indemnification provisions like those found in a typical NASA
launch service agreement. Moreover, the CSLA does not
require specific risk allocation agreements between the
parties.
Many of the details concerning the licensing process for
commercial space launches are left for agency regulation.2 1 1 For example, OCST is authorized to promulgate
a detailed multilevel certification process to insure a high
degree of safety from all participants in a launch. 2 Unfortunately, the original CSLA provisions regarding risk
allocation and insurance are arguably too indefinite and
unworkable.2 3
C.

HURDLE Two AND THE AMENDMENTS

The passage of the CSLA in 1984 successfully scaled
the first hurdle to privatizing the launch industry. Nonetheless, the space insurance crisis and the deterring effect
of runaway liability still presented a formidable second
hurdle.21 4 Following the Challenger disaster and several
other launch failures, the private launch industry faced
near extinction despite the growing demand for launch
services. 2 ' 5 Therefore, in 1988 Congress amended the
49 U.S.C. app, § 2615 (1988).
Id. § 2615(a).
21, Ritholz, supra note 146, at 152.
212 Some suggest a certification process similar to the existing process for aircraft. Id. at 153; see also 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1423-24 (1988) (aircraft certification
legislation).
21 See Yelton, supra note 18, at 134 (describing insurance and risk-sharing provisions of the CSLA).
214 See Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 10-11 (describing "[t]he
magnitude of the liability and insurance problems that had prevented the growth
of the American commercial launch industry").
21.1See supra part II.D.
21,
20
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CSLA, relieving many of the problems related to space
insurance and liability. t6
Limitation of liability for developing industries is not a
novel idea. In 1929 the Warsaw Convention limited international air carriers' liability for damage to passengers
and luggage,2 1 7 and the Rome Convention later capped
responsibility for damage caused by aircraft to property
on the ground or to third-parties. 8 In 1978 the Supreme
Court upheld legislation 219 designed to encourage the nuclear power industry by limiting the accident liability of
Similarly, government efforts to
utility companies. 2
temper the anxiety of massive space liability claims would
encourage development of private space launch
ventures .22
In the 1920s and 30s, the young air transportation industry received a shot in the arm from air mail subsidies,
technology transfers from military programs, and subsidies for the military reserve air transport fleet. 222 When
the U.S. Post Office decided to fly air mail, the government created a new market for the young aircraft industry
and encouraged development of the legendary Douglas
Aircraft Company DC-3.223 More recently, the government established an aviation insurance fund to cover uninsurable risks associated with war, hijacking, and other
216 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988); Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra
note 3, at 11 (Congress takes action to "kick start" the heavily burdened commercial space launch industry).
217 Convention on International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 2 Bevans 983.
21, The Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on
the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181.
219 Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), as amended
by Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-2 10, § 1, 79 Stat 855 (1965) and Act of
Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, §§ 2-14, 89 Stat 1111 (1975) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1988)).
220 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't Study, 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978) (upholding
legislation found to be rationally related to encouraging private development of
the nuclear power industry).
221 Dula, supra note 17, at 186.
222 Id.
225 Hudgins, supra note 31.
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terrorist activities.224 Similarly, a combined spaceflight insurance fund could offer protection to private industries
225
through substantial risk pooling.
In its infancy, the nuclear industry encountered the
same cost-prohibitive insurance premiums that the commercial space launch industry now faces. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954226 ended the government monopoly in
the nuclear industry and left the door open for private enterprise. Utility companies refused to enter such a risky
field, so Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act 227 to:
(1) protect the public by establishing a fund to cover accident claims and (2) protect the new commercial nuclear
industry by limiting potentially massive liability. 22 In particular, this legislation provides government indemnification and liability limitations for the nuclear power
industry. 229 The Price-Anderson Act also requires licensees to purchase insurance in an amount established by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.23 ° In turn, the
Commission indemnifies a licensee up to $500 million for
each nuclear accident. 23 ' The CSLA Amendments contain similar measures demonstrating a strong government
policy to encourage the burgeoning commercial space industry through legislation.232
The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology
and Space held hearings on November 7, 1985, to appraise the status of insurance issues hindering development of the commercial space industry. 33 During 1984
and 1985, space launch and in-orbit losses of seven major
224

49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1531-42 (1988).

Dula, supra note 17, at 186.
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, § 68 Stat 919 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988)).
227 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
228 See S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2251,2251.
229 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
22,

226

20
2 1
2-2
23-

Id. § 2210(a).
Id. § 2210(e).
49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
Senate Space Insurance Hearings, supra note 64, at 1.
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satellites generated combined insurance claims in excess
of $600 million.2 34 The industry also experienced a major
setback in 1984 with the loss of two satellites on the Shuttle. 35 Since 1978, the accumulative loss ratio degraded to
approximately $840 million in losses compared to a mere
$430 million collected in premiums. 236 As a result, satellite insurance capacity of $250-300 million per launch in
1983, at a premium rate of five to seven percent of satellite cost, decreased to $50-75 million in 1987, at premium
rate in excess of twenty to twenty-five percent of satellite
CoSt. 23 7 For a large commercial space venture, the financial feasibility of the mission severely diminishes when insurance costs exceed 2.5 percent of the expected gross
revenues. 2 38 In such a case, businesses may opt for competing alternative technology on the Earth. 39
In September 1987, the House Committee on Science,
Space and Technology began hearings to assess the
health of the launch industry following the Challenger
disaster.2 40 For two years, not a single American satellite
customer had scheduled a launch date with an American
launch provider. 4 ' Prospective launch providers ex234 Id. at 50 (statement of Daniel E. Cassidy, Vice President, Marsh & McLennan
Aviation and Aerospace).
2-5 One satellite for the Indonesian government and one for Western Union
failed to reach their desired orbits due to a failure in each spacecraft's Payload
Assist Module (PAM). Natalie Angier, Rounding Up the Runaways, TIME, Nov. 26,
1984, at 22. The incident received international attention when a later Shuttle
flight attempted a daring recapture and salvage operation. Id. For a discussion of
the legal events following the loss of both telecommunication satellites, see infra,
parts V.A-B.
236 Senate Space Insurance Hearings, supra note 64, at 50 (statement of Daniel E.
Cassidy, Vice President Marsh & McLennan Aviation and Aerospace).
237 Id.

238 ECON, INC., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY IN-

105 (Jan. 2, 1985) (prepared for NASA under
Contract No. NASW-3339).
239 Id. at 98-99.
240 State of the Commercial Space Launch Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Space Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 100th
Cong., I st Sess. 1, 9 (1987) (statement of George A. Koopman, President, American Rocket Company) [hereinafter Koopman Statement].
24, Lillian M. Trippett, Legislative Initiatives to Encourage Private Activity, 4 J.L. &
TECH. 49, 51 (1989).
SURANCE TO SPACE VEHICLE USERS,
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pressed concern over the potential liability and the inadequate guidance regarding insurance in the CSLA. 42 The
American launch industry also faced government subsidized competition from the French, the Chinese, and the
Soviet Union.243 The House Committee, therefore, reviewed the launching practices of the Air Force and
NASA, searching for a way to help the struggling
industry.24 4
A few months prior to the House hearings, the government issued a first draft of the Air Force Model Agreement designed to regulate the private use of certain
national ranges for space launches.2 45 The commercial
launch industry voiced its reservations over the liability
insurance and risk allocation provisions. 46 The original
agreement requires launch users to assume risk for all
damages and to obtain the "aggregate maximum casualty
' 24
and liability insurance available on the world market. 1
The Air Force refused to set a specific amount of insurance required or to offer indemnity for large losses.248
With little aid or guidance from the U.S. government to
help mitigate potentially massive losses, private industry
was hesitant to invest in space enterprises under the original Air Force Model Agreement.249
In response to industry's outcry for more guidance, the
Air Force issued a revised model agreement in January of
1988.250 The new agreement requires the user to indemnify the government for any third-party claims arising
Id. at 51-52.
Katherine M. Gorove, The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988: A
Brief Overview, 16J. SPACE L. 184, 185 (1988). The French Government and the
European Space Agency fully indemnify Arianespace for losses in excess of $70
million. Id. The Chinese Long March and Soviet Proton launches are completely
insured by the state. Id.
244 Trippett, supra note 241, at 51-52.
245 Koopman Statement, supra note 240, at 9.
246 Id. at 10.
242
243

247

Id.

Yelton, supra note 18, at 132.
Koopman Statement, supra note 240, at 10.
250 For a complete text of the Model Agreement, see CommercialSpace Launch Act
Amendments of 1988: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Space Science andApplications of the
248
249
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from the production, marketing, and use of government
facilities or services, and for any environmental incidents
or related legal violations.251 In response to industry
complaints, the new agreement defines "maximum available insurance" as "the amount of insurance available in
the world market at a reasonable premium and on terms
considered commercially reasonable for the risks involved
to fund the User's responsibilities under the Agreement
.... 52 The revised agreement, however, still lacked
provisions for limitation of liability or government
indemnification.
Prior to the adoption of the CSLA, NASA also developed a risk apportionment scheme for its private customers. 253 A typical NASA launch service agreement requires
the user to obtain the maximum available liability insurance against third-party claims at a reasonable cost, and
NASA assumes responsibility for claims above the insurable limit.2 54 In addition, NASA encourages "no-fault, no
subrogation, interparty waiver of liability" agreements to
cover damage to both government property and the
payload. 255 These agreements require parties to bear the
risk of damage or loss to their own property.256
House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 2 at 227
(1988) [hereinafter House Amendment Hearings].
251 Id. at 232 (art. IV, § c).
212 Id. (art. IV, § b(3)).
251 See id. at 11-13 (testimony of John E. O'Brien, General Counsel, NASA).
24 Id. In a Senate hearing, however, Mr. O'Brien, General Counsel for NASA,
stated that the private sector can provide the "requisite satellite insurance" and
stressed that NASA is not in the insurance business. Senate Space Insurance Hearings, supra note 64, at 4-5.
255 House Amendment Hearings, supra note 250, at 12. The NASA waiver requires
parties to:
agree to a no-fault, no subrogation, interparty waiver of liability pursuant to which each party agrees not to bring a claim against or sue
the other party ... and agrees to absorb the financial and any other
consequences for Damage it incurs to its own property ...as a result
of participation in [Shuttle] Operations . . . regardless of whether
such Damage arises through negligence or otherwise.
48 C.F.R. § 1852.228-72 (1984).
256 Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 72324 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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The House Committee favored the successful practice
of the European space consortium, Arianespace, which
borrowed the NASA provisions and made it work for a
commercial enterprise.25 7 The Reagan Administration
unsuccessfully lobbied for additional amendments that
would protect the ELV industry through tort reform by
capping pain and suffering damages at $200,000.258 After
a heated debate that nearly killed the entire bill, Congress
adopted the risk-sharing provisions used by NASA.259
The CSLA required a licensee to obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility. ° Under
this scheme, several agencies exercised authority to set
the amount of liability insurance, which created confusion in the ELV industry.2 6 ' The Amendments contain
very particular guidelines setting the maximum insurable
requirements for (1) third-party claims, (2) damage to
government property, and (3) cross-claims between parties participating in the launch.262 Under this new legislation, the licensee must first demonstrate financial
responsibility or obtain third-party liability insurance not
to exceed the lesser of $500 million or the maximum liability insurance available on the world market at reasonable cost. 26 3 Second, the licensee must demonstrate
financial responsibility or obtain insurance to cover loss
or damage to government property not to exceed the
lesser of $100 million or the maximum coverage available
Trippett, supra note 241, at 52.
See Launch InsuranceDispute ThreatensLegislation, Avi. Wx. & SPACE TECH., Feb.
22, 1988, at 22.
259 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
"The bill provides for a cross waiver of damages resulting from accidents which are not the result of the willful misconduct.... This is exactly how we handled space shuttle launches .... " 134 CONG.
REc. 12,116 (daily ed. May 24, 1988) (statement of Rep. Walker, ranking minority
member on the House Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications). To appease the Administration's concern with subsidizing the industry, the Senate
amended the bill to sunset the government indemnity after five years. 49 U.S.C.
§ 2615(b)(5) (1988).
249 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
261 Yelton, supra note 18, at 134.
262 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
263 Id. § 2615(a)(1)(A).
257
258
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at reasonable rates. 2r 4 Finally, each licensee must sign reciprocal waivers of claims with all participants, including
the government. 265 The Secretary of Transportation determines the maximum probable loss of a particular
launch in consultation with the Administrator of NASA,
the Secretary of the Air Force, and the heads of other appropriate agencies.26 6 In return for the licensee obtaining
liability insurance and signing cross-waivers, the United
States agrees to indemnify third-party claims in excess of
the maximum probable loss, but not more than $1.5
billion.267
Since the adoption of the Amendments, the DOT has
actively licensed individual launches and established insurance limits. Space Services, Inc. successfully launched
the Starfire rocket in March 1989 under the expedited licensing process of OCST. 268 This first commercial launch
licensed under the amended CSLA flew a payload of six
scientific experiments for eight minutes over the White
Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.269 OCST required
Space Services to purchase a $10 million liability insurance policy at a cost of $30,000.27 °
In September 1989, a McDonnell Douglas Delta rocket
launched a communications satellite, marking the first
completely private orbital launch under the Amendments.2 7 ' OCST issued minimum insurance requirements
for McDonnell Douglas and later set limits for General
Dynamics and Martin Marietta launches.272 Not until the
loss of an Intelsat payload on a Martin Marietta Titan III
rocket was the policy behind the waivers challenged in
Id. § 2615(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 2615(a)(1)(C)-(D).
266 Id. § 2615(a)(1)(A).
267 Id. § 2615(b)(1).
268 Yelton, supra note 18, at 136 (citing Mark Carreau, Houston Firm's Rocket May
Launch New Age in Space Commerce, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1989, at 3A).
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Edward
H. Kolcum, U.S. Sets Insurance Minimums for Commercial Space
Launches, Avi. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 30, 1989, at 69.
26

265
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court.2 7 3

V.

BOTCHED LAUNCHES GO TO COURT

Few cases involving a space launch provider's liability
for a failed launch ever appear in court, but recently several space law decisions shed light on the evolving law
governing commercial launch companies. Lexington Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,274 turning on events
and agreements signed before enactment of the CSLA,
demonstrates the unwillingness of courts to allow contractual limitations on the tort liability of launch providers. 7 5
A companion case, Appalachian Insurance Co. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,276 expresses a different attitude, honoring
exculpatory clauses in launch service agreements involving large, sophisticated corporations contracting in a
highly specialized and risky new technology.277 Finally,
Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Satellite Organization278 represents the most recent judicial
treatment of the public policy announced in the
Amendments.279
A.

LEXINGTON INSURANCE V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

On February 3, 1984, the Space Shuttle Challenger carried two satellites, the Westar VI and the Palapa B-2, into
low Earth orbit. Each satellite relied on a Payload Assist
273

Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Satellite Org.,

763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1992).
274 Stephen R. Ginger, The Trial of the PalapaB-2 Case: A Look at the Liability Issue
in Commercial Space Launches, 38 FED. BAR NEWS &J., 132, 132 (Apr. 1991) (citing
Lexington Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 481713 (Cal. Super. Ct.,

Orange Co., May 1990)).

275 Id. at 134. "The court held simply that plaintiffs were entitled to assert a
negligence action under California law and that the risk allocation provision of
Perumtel's contracts did not prevent them from doing so." Id.
276 262 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
277

Id. at 730-31.

271 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (4th

Cir. 1992).
279 Id. at 1333 (district court disallowing any claims for negligence or even gross
negligence for customer property losses).

1993]

SPACE LA UNCH TORTS

833

Module (PAM) designed to boost the telecommunication
hardware into geosynchronous orbit, but both PAMs
burned out prematurely, leaving the satellites inoperable. 280 The owners of the two satellites, the Government
of Indonesia and Western Union, submitted insurance
claims for losses totalling $180 million. 8 ' Several insurance companies then brought suit against McDonnell
Douglas, Morton Thiokol, and Hitco for subrogation of
2 82
the insurance claims.
The court honored a contractual disclaimer of liability
and dismissed the Westar VI case. 83 Western Union
signed a disclaimer with McDonnell Douglas that covered
any failure of the PAM and disallowed any subrogation
suits by the insurers.2 8 4 The Palapa B-2 case survived dismissal, however, and became the first jury trial ever arising from the U.S. space program. 8 5
Since the launch occurred in February 1984, the CSLA
did not govern the parties in the Palapa B-2 case.28 6 Instead, the launch agreement between the Indonesian government and NASA contained a "no fault, no subrogation
interparty waiver of liability. 28 7 In addition, Perumtel,
Indonesia's wholly-owned communications company, bargained with Hughes Aircraft Company for a lower satellite
price and expressly agreed to take title to the Palapa B-2
and assume the risk of loss. 288 Accordingly, Perumtel
purchased liability insurance in the event the Shuttle or
280 The Palapa B-I successfully reached geosynchronous orbit in June of 1983
using an identical PAM upper stage module.
28, Ginger, supra note 274, at 132.
282 Id.
282 Id.
28
Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 481712 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Orange Co., May 1990). A California appellate court affirmed the granting of
summary judgement to the defendants based on exculpatory clauses in the McDonnell Douglas/Western Union launch contract. Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr. at
718. See infra part V.B for a discussion of the Appalachian case.
285 Ginger, supra note 274, at 134.
286 Id. The CSLA took effect 180 days after enactment on Oct. 30, 1984. Pub.
L. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3064.
287 Ginger, supra note 274, at 132.
2a Id.
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PAM failed to deliver the Palapa B-2 to the proper geosynchronous orbit. 89
At trial, McDonnell Douglas argued that insurance
companies could not recover on a negligence theory because Perumtel agreed to assume the risk of loss. McDonnell Douglas also asserted that interparty waivers of
liability prohibited all parties from suing each other over
losses resulting from the launch. The court concluded
that the specific risk allocation provisions in Perumtel's
contracts did not prevent the insurers from bringing a
negligence action under California state law.2 90 The jury
heard detailed evidence of negligent design and testing of
the PAM and concluded that the defendants were not liable. 29 ' The jury did, however, find that Morton Thiokol
breached a warranty covering the PAM rocket motor and
awarded the insurers $37,500, the pro rata share for replacing the motor.2 9
Aside from being the first space jury trial in the United
States, Lexington illustrates an unwillingness to allow freely
negotiated contractual limitations on liability to preclude
a negligence action. 29 The CSLA, and particularly the
Amendments concerning reciprocal cross-waivers of liability, were enacted several years after the events giving
rise to Lexington.29 4 Later, in Martin Marietta, the district
court dismissed claims for negligence and gross negligence relying primarily on the congressional public policy
behind the Amendments.295
B.

APPALACHIAN INSURANCE V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

The Westar VI satellite, which accompanied the Palapa
B-2 on the ill-fated flight of the Challenger on February 3,
289

Id. at 132-33.

- Id. at 134.
291 Id.
292 Id.
292
2-

295

Id.
49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
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1984, was the subject of another suit.296 Five of the insurers that paid Western Union $105 million for loss of the
Westar VI later brought suit against McDonnell Douglas,
Morton Thiokol, and Hitco for negligence and strict products liability. The trial court honored the exculpatory
clauses in the McDonnell Douglas/Western Union service
contract and granted summary judgement in favor of the
defendants.29 7 The appellate court affirmed. 9 8
On appeal, Appalachian argued that summary judgement should not have been granted because the waiver
provisions in the McDonnell service contract are "ambiguous, unconscionable, against public interest, do not reflect the parties' true agreement, and unlawfully
disclaimed strict products liability. ' 299 Appalachian maintained that the interparty waiver clause included in the
McDonnell contract contained language similar to the
waiver in the NASA launch service agreement with Western Union. The intent in drafting and adopting the exculpatory language in the McDonnell contract, Appalachian
claimed, was to incorporate the same interparty waivers
required by NASA in all Shuttle flights.3 0 0 Since NASA's
interparty waiver did not preclude a claim between a
Shuttle customer and its own contractors, Appalachian argued that the McDonnell contract similarly allowed a subrogation suit brought by Western Union's insurers against
McDonnell Douglas and its subcontractors.
The court ruled that although the NASA and McDonnell agreements contained similar language, they were not
identical.3 0 ' The McDonnell agreement, explained the
court, accomplished the policy behind the NASA in2- Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 718
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
-7

Id. at 718.

Id.
Id.
300 Id. at 724-25. NASA required an interparty waiver of liability among customers to encourage use of the Shuttle without incurring liability for damage to
other customers' payload. Id.
-1 Id. at 725.
298
29
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terparty waivers, but also included other clear limitations.3 °2 One of these limitations prevented Appalachian
and the other insurers from suing McDonnell Douglas
and its subcontractors. 0 3
Appalachian also asserted that the same exculpatory
clauses were not a "commercially reasonable allocation of
risk" and were thus unconscionable. °4 The court responded that when negotiating a contract involving specialized services in a high risk business it was not
"unreasonable for the parties to agree Western Union
would obtain insurance... rather than to have McDonnell
Douglas warrant performance of the upper stage
rocket. 3 0 5 The court, in affirming the lower court decision, emphasized that this was "not a standardized adhesion contract but the result of a voluntary agreement." ' 6
C.

MARTIN MARIETTA V. INTELSAT

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Intelsat3 0 7 represents the first judicial effort to interpret new provisions in the Amendments that require participants to execute reciprocal
waivers of liability.308 The district court concluded that all
actions in tort, including gross negligence, are waived in
light of the strong congressional policy to encourage the
private launch industry. 30 9 This strong interpretation of
congressional intent is a departure from launching practice under a typical NASA launch service agreement or the
Air Force Model Agreement, typified by the Lexington
case,3 10 and poses several questions regarding the future
of the commercial space launch business.3 '1
302

Id.

303 Id.

304 Id. at 730.
303

Id. at 731.

30-

Id. at 734.

307 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1327.

s08 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
3- Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1334.
310 Lexington Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 481713 (Cal. Super.

Ct., Orange Co., May 1990).
3-1 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1334.
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In August 1987 Intelsat and Martin Marietta entered
into a contract to launch two satellites on Titan III rockets. 1 2 Martin Marietta agreed to launch the satellites in
return for a fixed payment from Intelsat of $112 million to
launch each satellite.' 1 3 Shortly after liftoff of the first
launch, the payload's separation system failed to eject the
satellite and its orbital booster. Intelsat engineers eventually separated the payload from the rocket, but the delay
left the satellite in a useless orbit.3 1 4 Experts estimated
the cost to rescue the satellite and place it in a proper orbit was $90 million. 1 5 Martin Marietta filed for declaratory judgment in the district court of Maryland and
Intelsat counterclaimed, asserting breach of contract. 6
In addition, Intelsat brought negligent misrepresentation,
negligence and gross negligence claims in an effort to recover damages1 7 for lost profits, lost use of the satellite, and
3
rescue CoStS.
Martin Marietta first argued that the Amendments require parties to execute reciprocal waivers of liability, effectively preempting Intelsat's three tort claims against
Martin Marietta.' 18 Martin Marietta also urged that the
312 Commercial Launch Services Contract Between Martin Marietta and Intelsat, Contract No. MMC-CTS-87-001 INTEL-629 (August 10, 1987) [hereinafter
Launch Contract] (on file with The Journalof Air Law and Commerce).
313 Martin Marietta stresses that they were to furnish launch services for a fixed
price and that they "shall be deemed to have completed the Launch Services for
each Launch under this Contract upon the intentional ignition of the Titan III
solid rocket motors." Id. art. 5.
314 Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 14; Intelsat Memorandum,
supra note 4, at 2.
315 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1329.
316 In a later unpublished opinion, the district court dismissed Intelsat's claims
for breach of contract. See Martin Marietta, 978 F.2d at 142. The Fourth Circuit
later revived the contract claims, finding ambiguity in the launch service contract
definition of "mission failure." Id. at 143.
"'7 Intelsat
also specifically challenged Martin Marietta's reliance on the
Amendments as "misplaced," noting that the Amendments were enacted "one
full year after the Contract was signed." Intelsat Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4.
318 Martin Marietta stated their argument in a memorandum to the court:
The Commercial Space Launch Act prohibits Intelsat from bringing
claims for property damage or loss against Martin Marietta, and
preempts all state law that is inconsistent with the Act's provisions or
purposes. The Act and its amendments articulate a national policy
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strong policy announced in the Amendments imputes
cross-waiver provisions to the launch contract. In addition, Martin Marietta asserted that Congress intended the
waiver provisions in the CSLA, standing alone, to preempt all state tort claims brought in connection with the
launch contract.
The court determined that Congress passed the
Amendments to the CSLA, including the cross-waiver
provisions, to "encourage industry expansion in a rapidly
shrinking market.13 9 The court explained that many
commercial ventures cannot afford insurance to protect
themselves from potentially massive tort actions, so Congress requires cross-waivers of liability in the licensing
procedure. 32 The cross-waiver provisions, the court reasoned, are only a condition to receive the license. 3 2 l The
fact that OCST issues a license that does not meet this
condition does not suggest that the license automatically
adopts the waiver provisions. 2 The court therefore rejected Martin Marietta's argument that the Amendments
impute such waivers.3 2
The court then emphasized that the remaining claims of
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and gross negligence can only survive if Intelsat established a duty beyond the launch service contract.3 2 4 Normally, duties in
tort arise from the efforts of the state to protect a vulnerable party. 5 Since both parties are equally sophisticated
in allocating their own risks, the court deferred to specific
language in the contract to define Martin Marietta's limthat supports the growth and development of a private-sector commercial launch industry. Intelsat's claims conflict with the explicit
language of the Act and are inconsistent with its purpose. Therefore, they must be dismissed.
Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 34-35.
-19 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1330.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324Id. at 1331.
325 Id.
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ited duties to Intelsat.3 2 6
Intelsat then argued that the warranty disclaimer provision in the launch service agreement did not apply to representations made after the contract, and therefore did
not shield Martin Marietta from liability. The court
stressed that both parties were equally sophisticated and
that their relationship was purely contractual. 3 " In the
absence of "an express duty of due care in making representations," the court found that the claim for negligent
misrepresentation after signing the contract could not
stand.38
Intelsat alternatively conceded an action in ordinary
negligence because there were contractual waivers in the
launch agreement, but contended that any waivers as to
gross negligence were against public policy. 2 9 In response, the court reasoned that since Congress amended
the CSLA to require such cross-waivers, the public policy
on this issue was clearly pronounced by legislation.3 3 0 According to the court, the legislative history of the Amendments showed that Congress intended mandatory waivers:
(1) to limit the total universe of claims that might arise as
a result of a launch; and (2) to eliminate the necessity for
all of these parties to obtain property and casualty insurance to protect against these claims.3 3 1 The court concluded that since the Amendments require parties
involved in space launch activities to bear their own
losses, allowing claims for negligence and gross negligence would undermine clear legislative intent and severely burden the space launch industry. 3
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1332-33.
328 Id. at 1333.
329 Intelsat states that "even unambiguous contractual provisions which do purport to relieve a party from liability for tort may not, on public policy grounds, be
construed to relieve that party from liability for intentional, willful, or grossly negligent acts." Intelsat Memorandum, supra note 4, at 28.
3-0 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1333.
3s, Id. at 1333-34 (quoting S. REP. No. 593, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14, reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5525, 5538 (1988)).
332 Id. at 1331. The district court speculates that there may possibly be a duty
326
327
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The court's exclusion of gross negligence departed
from the effect of a typical NASA launch service agreement and the Air Force Model Agreement. 3 Both agreements contain explicit language excepting waiver of
liability for gross negligence or willful acts of the government. Under the Air Force Model Agreement the contractor assumes risk for all loss or damage "except as
waived by DOT or resulting from 'the reckless disregard
or willful misconduct of the United States or its
agents.' ,,334 A typical NASA launch service agreement
provides that the insurance coverage obtained by the contractor "may exclude damage caused by the U.S. Govern' 5
ment's willful misconduct or reckless disregard." "3
Under the reciprocal waiver provisions in the Amendments, each party assumes responsibility for property
damage or loss from activities carried out under the
launch license. 36 The statutory language of the Amendments requires cross-waivers for any damage or loss and
contains no specific exceptions for liability arising
out of
33 7
gross negligence or even willful misconduct.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, upholding the lower court's dismissal of
the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims,
but reversing the dismissal of the contract and gross negligence claims.3 3 8 As to the contract claim, the court reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that the launch
contract is not free from ambiguity when viewed in the
light most favorable to Intelsat.3 3 9 The court carefully anbeyond the contract terms not to "intentionally, willfully or fraudulently abandon
the contract." Id.
-s3 See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
34 Kissick, supra note 69, at 38 (quoting Air Force Model Agreement, Art. IV.
c.2).
33- Id. at 38-39 (quoting NASA Sample Contract, Art. IV,
3.b).
336 SENATE REPORT, supra note 58, at 14. The report clearly states that the crosswaivers of liability "shall stipulate that each party is responsible for any property
damage or personal injuries that it sustains." Id.
33, Kissick, supra note 69, at 37-38.
338 Martin Marietta, 978 F.2d at 141.
339 Id. at 143.
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alyzed the launch contract itself and the Interface Control
Document, a separate agreement detailing the design and
operation of each launch, and found an ambiguity in the
definition of "mission failure.

3 40

The court also found

that the interplay between Article 6 of the launch contract, which specified a replacement launch as the exclusive remedy, and Article 17, which placed damage caps on
34 1
all other claims, was "far from crystal clear."

As to the negligent and negligent misrepresentation
claims, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court's
reasoning that no duty of care in tort arose out of the contract or out of the unique relationship of the parties.3 42
Since the parties are equally sophisticated and their only
relationship is contractual, no express duty of care arises
out of the contract.3 43 Similarly, the relationship between
Martin Marietta, a large aerospace company, and Intelsat,
an international telecommunications giant, does not present circumstances where the law imposes a duty of due
care independent of the contract. 3 " Therefore, the appellate court upheld the dismissal of the negligent and
negligent misrepresentation claims. 4
Finally, the Fourth Circuit refused to follow the district
court's adherence to a congressional intent evident in the
Amendments to protect parties from liability for their own
gross negligence. 46 The court first noted that the contract was signed before enactment of the Amendment and
added, in dicta, that even if the Amendments applied retroactively, there is no evidence of congressional intent to
waive gross negligence claims.3 4 7 The Fourth Circuit reversed the gross negligence dismissal, relying on a Mary540 Id. Martin Marietta argued that failure of the satellite to separate was a
"mission failure" leaving Intelsat with the sole remedy of a replacement launch.
Id.
s., Id,
342 Id. at 144.
'43
344
34
546

347

Id.

Id.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id.
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land court of special appeals case,3 48 which found that a
contract cannot waive liability for gross negligence.
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the lower court's emphasis of the launch contract as the basis of liability between a
satellite owner and a launch company. The court, however, refused to allow a waiver of gross negligence claims
despite the strong language of the Amendments supporting an underlying policy to encourage growth of the
American space launch industry. The Fourth Circuit may
have only cracked the door for tort recovery in space
launch mishaps, but this small glimmer of potentially massive tort liability may blind the vision of private space
entrepreneurs.
VI.

CRIES FOR TORT SHOULD FALL
ON DEAF EARS

For years our government, through NASA and the Air
Force, dedicated large sums of money and took great risks
to develop the technology of space flight. The government now wishes to transfer this technology and many of
the facilities to the private sector and allow economic
forces to shape the new industry. The small space entrepreneur, overburdened by the piecemeal regulation of
private launches, urged Congress to pass the CSLA in
1984. Following the Challenger disaster and a breakdown
in the space insurance market, private launchers demanded relief from massive liability and expensive insurance. Responding to this outcry, Congress amended the
CSLA in 1988. The effect of these legislative efforts went
essentially untested in court, until the district court and
Fourth Circuit decisions in Martin Marietta.
Martin Marietta emphasizes the importance of the
launch service agreement.3 49 Since all foreseeable private
Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485, 488 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
349Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Satellite Org.,
763 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1992) ("Equally sophisticated parties who have the opportunity to allocate
risks to third party insurance or among one another should be held to only those
348
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launch activities will involve large and sophisticated companies, the aggrieved party should not find relief beyond
the obligations specifically included in the launch contract.,350 Each participant in the launch must allocate its
own risks, buy insurance, or make other contractual arrangements to protect its investment. 3 5 Anything can be
contracted, and in light of the mandatory reciprocal crosswaivers of liability, there is a strong public policy supporting agreements to waive tort claims.3 52
The Fourth Circuit in Martin Marietta, however, rekindled the tortious flame for claims of gross negligence.
The appellate decision overrules a policy followed by the
lower court denying any recovery in tort short of intentional acts for a space launch mishap. Now an aggrieved
satellite owner, after following the mandates of the
Amendments to sign cross waivers of liability and
purchase insurance, can still allege gross negligence. This
window of opportunity to recover in tort provided by the
Fourth Circuit conflicts with the overall policy of the
Amendments to insulate the fledgling launch industry
from uncertain liabilities.
A legal system free of nonintentional tortious recovery
may arguably lead to a lack of assurance that the launch
provider will perform its obligations in good faith. The
customer is, however, assured of performance under the
contract in two independent ways. First, the licensing
procedure of the OCST insures a high level of technical
competency and safety. 53 Second, parties are free to contract for any performance standards or contingency arrangements if the launch provider does not supply
adequate services. Although the law of commercial space
launches announced in Martin Marietta relies primarily on
the private agreement between parties, the amended
duties specified by the agreed upon contractual terms and not to general tort duties imposed by state law.").
350 Id.
351Id.
352 Id. at 1333.

35314 C.F.R. § 411.5 (1992).
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CSLA provides important checks through licensing and
insurance requirements. 5 4 The clear and resounding
spirit of the amended CSLA is that free enterprise and
freedom of contract now reign in the commercial space
launch industry.
Space offers great rewards, but only at great risk. To
encourage bold entrepreneurs to explore and exploit the
vast resources in the great beyond, Congress passed the
Commercial Space Launch Act in 1984 and later its
Amendments in 1988. The rules of the game that courts
should now follow are simple: enter at your own peril, allocate the risks in a contract, and do not scream "Tort!"
when something goes wrong.

354

49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).

